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Abstract 
We  study  how  people's  predisposition  towards  altruism,  as  measured  by  tools 
developed by psychologists, affects their behavior in a voluntary contributions public 
good experiment. Earlier experiments provide evidence against the strong free rider 
hypothesis; however, contributions to the public good decrease with repetition*  We 
investigate  whether  a  high  level  of  contributions  can  be  sustained in  groups  of 
subjects who have been pre-selected on the basis of their altruistic inclinations. In the 
first stage of the experiment, each subject responds to a psychology questionnaire that 
measures various dimensions of one's personality. The subjects are then matched in 
groups according to their altruism scores, and engage in  a voluntary contribution 
game. We consider whether the levels and dynamics of  group contributions differ 
significantly  between  the  groups  with  altruists  and  non-altruists.  We  find  that 
subjects' altruism has a weak but positive effect on )=roup  behavior in  the public good 
game. 
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We study how people's predisposition towards altruism,' as measured by tools 
developed  by  psychologists,  affects  people's  behavior  in  voluntary  contributions 
public  good  experiments. The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) has been 
widely used to study the provision of public goods. The parameter profile in a typical 
VCM  experiment  is  set  so that  it  is  Pareto  optimal  for all players  to  contribute 
everything to the public good, but the dominant strategy for each player is to free-ride 
and contribute nothing toward the public good provision. However, the strong free- 
rider hypothesis  is  commonly rejected by  experimental evidence. Researchers find 
that on average participants contribute 40-60% of their total endowments (Davis and 
Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995). Bohm (1972) was one of the frrst studies to suggest that 
people  might  be  willing  to  contribute  to  the  public  good  despite  the  strategy 
conflicting  with their self-interest. Research that followed shows that a large portion 
of cooperative behavior cannot be explained by people"  confusion with the game and 
should be  attributed to their taste  for cooperation (Andreoni,  1995; Palfrey and 
Prisbrey,  1997). Further,  evidence  from both  economic  and  psychological VCM 
experiments indicates  that  there  are  substantial  differences in  subjects'  attitudes 
towards contributing to the public good (Offerman, Sonnemans and Schrarn, 1996). 
Another  robust  finding  from  VCM  experiments  is  that  the  leveI  of 
contributions declines with repetition (Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard, 1995). It is still 
an  open question, however,  whether the  decline is  due  to  subjects  learning their 
dominant  strategies, or because  cooperative behavior by  some individuals  is  not 
reciprocated by  others. Andseoni  (1995)  suggests that the movement  towards the 
equilibrium in the later periods of experiments is due to people's  frustrated attempt at 
cooperation, rather than learning the free-riding incentives. Offerman et al. (1996) 
note that  according to the triangular hypotheses in psychology, cooperators dislike 
being the "sucker"  and adapt their preferred cooperative behavior to selfish behavior 
after a while, when  they are confronted by  selfish behavior.  Their study provides 
some experimental support for the hypothesis in the context of step level public good 
games, 
1 Here we do not distinguish between "altruism" (utility-interdependency) and "warm-glow" (utility 
from the act of connibuting). We use the term altruism to denote people's general taste for cooperation, 
referred to as "kindness"  by Andreoni (1 995). This paper aims to answer two questions of interest. One is whether people 
who  may be  classified by psychologists  as altruists contribute more in the VCM 
experiments than selfish individuals, when matched into groups of people with similar 
predisposition towards altruism. The second question is whether altruists'goups can 
avoid the decline in the levels of contributions that has been observed in the groups 
composed of individuals with heterogeneous value orientations. 
A number of recent studies consider the underlying preferences or values that 
might lead an individwil to be more or less likely to contribute. Offerman et al. (1996) 
use financial incentives to measure subjects'  value orientations, and then study how 
value  orientations relate to  people's  behavior  in  step-level public  goods  (SLPG) 
experiments. They find that individuals with cooperative value orientations contribute 
more  often in  SLPG experiments  than  individualists  do.  However,  incentives to 
contribute are quite different between a traditional public good and a SLPG games, as 
in  the  SLPG  game there  is  a Nash  Equilibrium  which  coincided with  a  Pareto 
optimum. This difference in incentive structures may translate into different dynamics 
of group contributions; in the experiments reported by Offerman et al, the level of 
contributions did not decline with time in two out of three treatments considered. 
Roelofs and Sigler (1998) study cultural values  in traditional public goods 
experiments. They use a management survey to measure people's  positions on the 
individualism/collectivism scale. An  individualist defines the self as a single person 
while a collectivist defmes the self as a member of a group. Roelofs and Sigler find no 
direct  effects between subjects'  individualism/collectivism survey scores and their 
contributions in the VCM. It is hard to say whether these results indicate that cultural 
values as measured by the survey have no effect on  behavior,  or that collectivists 
switched to free-riding because they were discouraged by the observed behavior of 
individualists. 
In  this  study  we  use  a  psychological questionnaire that  measures  various 
dimensions of one's personality to evaluate people's predisposition to altruism. We 
then sort subjects in groups according their altruism scores, and study the differences 
in group contributions between the groups of altruists and non-altruists. We consider 
whether the level and dynamics of group contributions differ significantly between 
the two types of groups. 2. Experimental Design 
The  experiment  consisted  of  two  parts.  In  the  first  part,  the  participants 
completed the Personal Meaningful Profile (PMP) questionnaire developed by Wong 
(1998). The questionnaire is composed of 57 questions that measure one's personality 
along  seven dimensions:  (1)  achievement; (2) relationship;  (3)  religion; (4)  self- 
transcendence; (5) self-acceptance; (6) intimacy; (7) fair treatment. Each question is 
measured on 7-point scale, form 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). The following nine 
questions were used to calculate each person's score for relationship, which was used 
as a proxy fox the level of altruism: 
10  I care about other people 
18  I relate well to others 
27  1  have a number of good friends 
28  I  am trusted by others 
32  1  am highly regarded by others 
41  I am altruistic and helpful 
42  I am liked by others 
45  I bring happiness to others 
50  I contribute to the well being of others 
The PMP is a relatively new instnunent, but it has been shown to be high in both 
reliability and validity (see Wong, 1998). For the relationship subscale used in this 
study, the reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha) is '8 1. While no validity studies 
have been done on the subscales independently, the relationship subscale is high in 
content validity for altruism. The  instrument allows for an unobtrusive assessment of 
altruism, as well as other personality factors that are potentially relevant to selfless 
actions, 
In the second part of the experiment, the subjects were matched into groups of 
five based on their altruism scores and participated in a standard VCM game. There 
were 20 periods in the VCM game plus two practice periods at the start (no money 
was earned during practice periods), In each period  each participant was endowed 
with 50 tokens which they had to allocate between a private and a public fund. The 
return to the private account was 0.01 while the return of each tokens in the group account was 0.02, and was divided evenly among all five pup  members. Thus the 
marginal per capita return (MPCR) was set at 0.4.' 
3. Procedures 
A total of eight experimental sessions were conducted. Two sessions had  10 
participants, where  the  five  top  scoring participants fkom the  questionnaire were 
matched in the "altruistic'  group and  the remaining  5 were  considered  the  "non- 
altruistic" group. The third session had only eight participants divided into two four- 
person groups at the second stage of the experiment; the parameters in the VCM were 
adjusted correspondingly to keep MPCR at 0.4.  The remaining five sessions were 
conducted with 15 subjects, divided into three 5-person groups at the second stage 
according to their altruism scores. This modification was to increase the difference in 
scores  between  the  altruistic  and  non-altruistic  group.  Participants  were  all 
undergraduates from the University of Melbourne with no prior experience in public 
good  experiments;  most  were  recruited  &om  first  year  commerce  subjects. 
Participants received $5 for punctual participation in addition to what they earned 
during the public good experiment. The average total pay out per participant was $19. 
All  payments  were  in  Australian  dollars.  The  experiment  was  ~om~uterized.~ 
Participants frtst sat at separate terminals and completed the questionnaire. They were 
then assigned into groups according to the ranking  of their  scores and  moved to 
assigned VCM subject terminals. No explanation was given on how the subjects were 
matched in groups. The layout of the room was such that participants fiom the same 
group were at least one terminal apart. Strictly no communication was allowed during 
the experiment. Participants were paid at the end of the session. 
Experimental instructions that  supplemented computerized instructions  are 
given in the appendix. 
4. Results 
The total of  103 subjects in  8  sessions participated in the experiment. The 
individual altruism scores ranged from 36 to 63, with a mean of 49.1  5, and a standard 
See Ledyard (1995) for a detailed explanation of MPCR. deviation of 5.96. Individual  contributions to the public  fund  ranged  from  0 (no 
contributions) to 50 tokens (full contribution), with a mean per period per subject of 
19.58 tokens, and a standard deviation of 17.5  1 tokens. 
Figures 1 to 3 display the dynamics of group contributions in the VCM game 
for each session, and pooled across the 2-group and 3-group sessions. 
FIGURES 1-3 HERE 
Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statistics of the group level data. Table  1 
summarizes the 2-group sessions, numbered from 1 to 3, with the "altruistic"  groups 
indexed by "A",  and "non-altruistic"  groups indexed by "B".  Table 2 summarizes the 
3-group sessions, numbered from 4 to 8, with the most "altruistic"  groups indexed by 
"A'"  intermediate score groups indexed by  "B",  and the least  "altruistic"  groups 
indexed by "C".  The tables show mean,  minimum and maximum scores from the 
questionnaire for  each session as  well  as within  each group.  Each group's  mean 
contribution is recorded along with the total contribution in the first period. To study 
the eEect of experience on contributions, we also present the average contribution in 
the first ten and the last ten periods of the VCM game, Average per period rates of 
change in contributions (in percentage points) are also displayed. 
Table 1. Summary of experimental results, 2-group sessions. 
From the graphs and the tables, we first observe that the general levels and 
dynamics  of  VCM  games  are  consistent  with  pervious  experimental  evidence. 
We are grateful to Jim Dang for developing a computerized version of the PMP questionnaire. The Average per session contributions across all groups ranged fiom 17.7% to 64.3%, 
with  the  mean  of  39.1%.  Also  in  accordance  with  previous  findings,  group 
contributions declined fiom the first ten to the last ten periods in 19 out of 21 groups. 
Consider  the  relationship  between  the  "altruism"  scores  and  levels  of 
contribution in VCM. A quick inspection of table 1 and figures ](I) and 2 shows that, 
in the &group sessions, there were no observable differences between the behavior of 
"altruistic'$ and "non-altruistic"  groups. In fact, the contributions in session 3 in most 
periods were higher for the "non-altruistic3 than for the '"a1tnristic'~oup. 
Table 2. Summary of experimental results, 3-group sessions: 
One  may  conjecture  that  these  results  could  be  attributed  to  insufficient 
difference  in  scores  between  the  "altruistic"  and  "non-altruistic"  groups,  or 
Arizona Science Laboratory VCM software was used to conduct the second stage of the experiment. 
In session 4, two of the subjects were assigned to groups "A"  and "B"  incorrectly. This explains why 
the minimal score! is group 4a is below the maximal score in group 4b. Still, importantly, the gap in 
scores between the "A"'  and the "C"  group remained positive. insufficient homogeneity, with respect to scores, within the groups  in the 2-group 
sessions"  It  is  therefore  of  interest  to  focus  on  the  3-group  sessions,  where 
composition within groups is more homogeneous, and there is a gap between minimal 
scores of 'Paltruisticy'  groups "A" and maximal scores of  "non-altruistic"  pups  "C". 
From  figure l(II) and the summary row  of table 2,  we  observe that, on  average, 
contributions of "altruistic"  groups "A"  are above contributions of  "non-altruistic" 
groups "C". However, this relationship is not consistent across all sessions: while in 
sessions 4-6  the  "altruists"  contributed  on  average more than  "non-altruists",  the 
opposite was true for sessions 7 and 8 (see table 2 and figure 3). According to the 
Mann-Whitney test, the average contributions in the  "A" groups were higher than in 
the "C"  groups at the significance level of  27.4% only (one-~ided).~  We also note 
that, swrpIrisingly, in 5 out of 8 sessions, (two 2-group sessions and 3 out of 5 3-groups 
sessions), the "non-altruistic" group first period contribution was greater than that of 
the "a1truistic"poup. 
Although the groups were ranked by their scores within each session, a perfect 
ranking of "altruistic"  and  %on-altruistic"  groups could not  be  guaranteed  across 
sessions: for example, the mean score of the "intermediate" group 4b was higher than 
the  mean  score  of the  "altruistic"  group  6a.  To avoid this problem,  we  consider 
correlation between  the  group  scores  and  group  contributions,  with  each  pup 
considered as an independent observation (groups from both Zgroup and  3-group 
sessions are included). The results are presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Correlation between group scores and average per person contribution of a group 
Generally there is a weak positive correlation between the scores (average, minimum 
and maximum) and the contribution, except for the observed first period contribution 
'  From tabtes 1 and 2 observe, however, that the gap in the mean scores between the "A"  and "B" 
groups in 2-group sessions (54.3 and 44.4, respectively) is as big as the gap between the corresponding 
scores in the "A"and  '"C"  groups in the 3-group sessions (54.3 and 44.0, respectively). Yet, the 
composition within groups is more homogeneaus in the 3-group sessions, 
6  An alternative test is to compare the group contributions  in 5 top ranking by score groups (across 
sessions) with those in 5 lowest ranking groups. According to the Mann-Whi&ey test, the null 
hypothesis of no differences is sustained at 42.1 % significance level (one-sided). there is a very weak negative correlation. The strongest (but still weak) relationship 
appears to be between the group contributions and the maximal score in the group. 
None of the correlation coefficients is statistically significant according to the t-test.' 
Correlation was generated for the individual scores as well. As can be seen in 
table 4 the relationship here is also extremely weak;  all correlation coefficients are 
insignifi~ant,~ 
Table 4: Cornlation between individual scores and contribution 
We next tunr to the relationship between the altruism scores and the dynamics 
of group contributions. The average per period rates of change in contributions and 
the corresponding correlation coefficients are displayed in the last columns of tables 
1-4. Consistently with our conjecture, we observe that, overall, the contributions in 
"altruistic"  groups  declined  slower than  in  "non-altruistic"  groups;  compare  the 
summary rows  for A-groups with  B-groups  in 2-group  sessions (table  I), and A- 
groups with C-groups in 3-group sessions (table 2). Tables 3 and 4 indicate that there 
is  a  weak  positive  correlation between  the  scores  and  the  rates  of  change  in 
contributions. The relationship becomes more pronounced if only 3-group sessions 
are  considered:  The  correlation  coefficients  between  the  rate  of  change  in 
contributions and the average, minimal and maximal groups scores increase to 0.421, 
0.268  and  0.420,  respectively.  The  correlation  between  the  rate  of  change  in 
contributions and both average and maximal group scores is significant at 10% level 
according to the t-test  (one-sided). The Mann-mtney test shows that the rate of 
contributions decline in "altruistic"  A-groups was lower than in "non-altruistic"  C- 
groups at  the  11.1% level (one-sided), We conclude that in 3-group sessions, the 
relationship between the scores and the rates of contribution change was noticeable 
overall, but there was still a significant heterogeneity in this respect across sessions. 
If only groups from 3-group session are considered, then correlation between group scores and 
contributions increases but remains statistically insignidant.  '  The conclusions on significance should be treated with caution here since individual contributions in 
the same group may not be truly independent. 5. Discussion 
The results  show that there is only a weak  relationships between people's 
altnristi~  predisposition, as measured by the PMP questiomaire, and their behavior in 
VCM public good games. We find that overall "altruistic"  groups displayed a higher 
level of contributions than "non-altruistic"  groups; however, the difference between 
the two types of groups was not statistically significant. "Altruistic" groups in 3-pup 
sessions exhibited a  slower rate  of  decrease in  contributions than  "non-altruistic" 
groups; still, contributions of all groups declined with repetition. In contrast with our 
conjecture, we find that higher altruism did not result in higher contributions in the 
first period of the VCM; this may be due to subjectsy  initial confusion with the game. 
The results suggest that, at least for inexperienced subjects, underlying values do not 
affect the level of contributions as such, but they influence the contribution dynamics. 
There  may  be  several  reasons  why  altruism,  as  measured  by  the  PMP 
questiomaire, did not prove  significant in explaining behavior in the VCM  game, 
First, this may be due to insufficient  variance in altruism scores between "altruistic" 
and  "non-altruistic"  groups,  Further  research is  necessary  to  investigate  whether 
increasing the gap in altruism scores between altruist and non-altruist groups would 
result in a stronger relationship between underlying values and behavior in the VCM 
game.  Second,  it  is  possible  that  direct  screening  instruments,  such  as  PMP 
questionnaire that we use,  are less  effective in predicting people's  behavior  than 
alternative indirect instruments. Offem  et al. (1996) use an incentive compatible 
instrument to measure subjects' value orientations, and fmd significant differences in 
the behavior of subjects with different  value^.^ Finally, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (1999) 
show that subjects may be effectively sorted into cooperators and fiee-riders not on 
the basis of their value orientations, but on the basis of their past  contributions in 
VCM. These authors interpret cooperation as coming fiom self-interested reciprocity 
rather than altruism. It is quite possible that contributions in public good experiments 
are driven by self-interest at least as much as by underlying taste for cooperation. 
9 Burks et al. (2000) report that in a trust game experiment, indirect measures of trust are better 
predictors of trust behavior than subjects' direct self-assessment on trust. The instructions: 
Good Moming/Afternoon. 
First of all I would like to thank you all for coming today. 
Part One: 
There are two parts to today's  experiment. The first part is a questionnaire and the 
second part is participation in a market situation. I will tell you more about it when we 
get to that part. 
Before starting the questionnaire you will need to enter your name and ID  number. 
Your ID number is the number on your terminal. 
When you  finish please wait patiently and do not exit the program as it may delete 
your record. If you have any questions please raise your hand and I will come and 
assist you. 
I ask that all mobile phones be  switched off and that you  do not  talk during this 
experiment, 
You may now begin. 
Part Two: 
We have now come to the second part of the experiment. You will now participate in 
a market situation. 
You will be given two practice periods in which you will not earn any money; this 
will be followed by 20 rounds. I will pay you the amount that you earn during these 
20 rounds in Australian dollars, not US dollars as indicated by the program. So feel 
free to earn as much as you can. 
You will be asked to enter your name and some numerical details. Only your name is 
important. For  your telephone  number  and  social security number just  enter  the 
required number of digits. 
1  remind you that there is absolutely no communication in this part of the experiment. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand and I will come and assist you. 
When you finish it is important that you wait patiently and do not exit the program, as 
it may delete your record and I won't be able to pay you the accurate amount. 
'O Each terminal was labeled from  1 - 10 or 1 -  15 depending on the size of  the  session. You have all been assigned a letter. Please now move to any terminal with the same 
letter. 
I hope you all have h  and good luck. References: 
Andreoni, J., 1995, Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confision? 
American Economic Review 85(4): 891  -904. 
Bohm,  P.,  1972, Estimating demand  for public  goods: An  experiment, European 
Economic Review 3: 1  1-30. 
Burks, S., J. Carpenter, and E. Verhoogen, 2000, Playing both roles in the trust game: 
the golden rule and Machiavellian behavior, Mimeo, University of Minnesota. 
Davis, D., and C. Holt, 1993, Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. 
Gunnthorsdottir, A,, D. Houser, K. McCabe and H. Arneden,  1999, Excluding free- 
riders  improves  reciprocity and  promotes  the  private  provision  of  public  goods, 
Mimeo, University of Arizona. 
Ledyard, J.,  1995, Public goods: A survey of experimental research, In: Kagel, J., and 
A. Roth (eds.), Handbook omperiment  Economics, Princeton University Press. 
Offeman, T., J. Sonnemans, and A. Schrarn, 1996, Value orientations, expectations 
and voluntary contributions in public goods, Economic Journal 106: 8 17-845. 
Palfiey, T., and J. Prisbrey, 1997, Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: 
How much and why? American Economic Review 87(5): 829-846. 
Roelofs, M.,  and T. Sigler,  1998, Individualism, collectivism and the public good: 
The  use  of  survey  evidence  from  an  economic  experiment,  Mimeo,  Western 
Washington University. 
Wong, P.,  1998, Implicit Theories of Meaningful Life and the Development of the 
Personal MeaningEul Profile, In:  P.  Wong and P.  Fry (Eds.),  The  human  quest for 
meaning:  A  handbook  of  psychological  research  and  clinical  applications, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 11  1- 140. I. 2-groups sessions pooled 
period 
il. 3-group sessions pooled 
period 
Figure 1 :  Dynamics of average group contributions in Pgroup and bgroup sessions Session 1 
period 
Session 2 
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